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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. MOOREf 
Defendant/Appellant• 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 890558CA 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by Michael Moore from judgments of 
conviction entered by the Eighth Judicial District Court of 
Duschene County, Utah, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, 
sitting by designation, upon jury verdicts finding the defendant 
guilty of eight counts of violating subsections (2) and (3) of 
Section 61-1-1 and Section 61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended (hereafter "U.C.A."). The jury verdicts referred to were 
returned on September 23, 1988; and the judgment and sentence of 
the Court from which the defendant/appellant appeals were 
pronounced on December 6, 1988. 
This appeal was originally docketed in the Utah Supreme 
Court under Section 78-2-2(3) ( j ) , U.C.A* because original 
jurisdiction over appeals from the criminal violations charged is 
not c l e a r l y ves ted in t h i s Court of Appea ls . However, a f t e r the 
Docketing S ta t emen t was f i l e d , the Supreme Court r e c e n t l y 
t r a n s f e r r e d the case to t h i s Court for d i s p o s i t i o n . I t must 
therefore be presumed tha t j u r i s d i c t i o n is found in t h i s Court on 
the b a s i s of Sec t ion 78-2a-3(2) ( f ) , U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues wi l l be presented for review: 
1. Whether the pe r iod of l i m i t a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by 
Sec t i on 71-1-302(1) i s a p p l i c a b l e to a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s of the 
Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act so as to have depr ived the D i s t r i c t 
Court of j u r i s d i c t i o n to t ry appel lant for the offenses charged. 
2. Whether t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l was 
s u f f i c i e n t to support the v e r d i c t s . 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the fo l lowing s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s 
w i l l be n e c e s s a r y to r e s o l v e the i s s u e s r a i s e d hereby . Al l 
r e f e r e n c e s to p r o v i s i o n s s e t f o r t h below are to the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
1. On the issue re la ted to the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s : 
6-1-302. Felony - Negligent homicide - Misdemeanor -
Any infraction - Commencement of prosecution. 
(1) Except as o t h e r w i s e provided in t h i s 
p a r t , p r o s e c u t i o n s for o the r o f f ense s are s u b j e c t 
to the following period of l i m i t a t i o n : 
(a) a p r o s e c u t i o n for a fe lony or 
n e g l i g e n t homicide s h a l l be commenced 
within four years af ter i t is committed: 
61-1-21 Penalties for vi olations - IniMiiUiun of 
Prosecutions. 
... No indictment or information may be 
returned or complaint filed under [the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act] more than 
five years after the alleged violation, 
(portions of the provision unrelated to 
this i ssue have been omitted. 
2. As to the determination i ,v-;^ ther the verdicts were 
j u s 11 f i ed b) i: 11 P e v i d e n c e i 
61-1 - 1, Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for; ^ny person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purchase o ..--7 security, 
directly or indi rectiy t :,: 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
riax Information charging appellant w : : \ ~ counts 
of violating Subsections (Ji m<l / - I ^H'-tion fil-l-l, utan Code 
Annotate:: I1'--. amended (fraud in the sale of s e c u r i t i e s ) , 
conduct . • • 11 't i- ho provisions of Sect ion 6 1 -1 - 2 ] , 
U.C.* - * . *- fie Seventh Circuit -..- Stat'"1 of; Utah, 
1; * j Roosevelt Department or : about October S, 1987. 
I n T. ;. • •; _ , . i) f w h • -^odiate vi c t i m , t h e 
alleged i- I-K* ^rose from the sale or promissory notes o.t American 
Facto r i r "in corporation, by Glen Bingham, a 
sa l e s r ep re sen ta t ive of the corporat ion (see Affidavit of Probable 
Cause for information, R. 14-30). 
On March 16, 1988 the Sta te f i led an Amended Information 
which deleted Count 4 re la ted to al leged v ic t ims Devan and Oral 
Fenn, one of whom had died (R. 42) . 
Al l Counts were bound over for t r i a l a t the c o n c l u s i o n 
of the p r e l i m i n a r y hea r ing (R. 1-3), and t r i a l of the cause was 
se t to be heard beginning September 19, 1988 before Judge Allen B. 
Sorenson, Senior D i s t r i c t Judge (R. 50). 
On S e p t e m b e r 19 , 1988 t h e S t a t e f i l e d an Amended 
I n f o r m a t i o n cover ing a l l coun t s found in the f i r s t Amended 
I n f o r m a t i o n , but which d e l e t e d from each charg ing count the 
language of s u b s e c t i o n (3) of Sec t ion 6 1 - 1 - 1 , thus l e av ing the 
fo l l owing language of Sec t ion 61-1-1(2) as the only b a s i s upon 
which appel lant was charged: 
I t i s unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the of fe r , s a l e , or purchase of any s e c u r i t y , 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to : 
(2) Make any un t rue s t a t e m e n t of a 
ma te r i a l fact or omit to s t a t e a ma te r i a l 
f a c t n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r t o make t h e 
s t a t e m e n t s made, in the l i g h t of the 
circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading; 
T r i a l of the cause con t inued for four t r i a l days . On 
September 23 , 1988 the j u ry r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s as to a l l 
Counts (R. 165-172) . 
On December 8, 1988 a p p e l l a n t appeared for s e n t e n c i n g 
4 
and was coiiimiM LJI! !. > t h e U t a h S t a t e Pr i s o n f o r a p e r i od of from 0 
t o 3 y e a r s and f i n e d t h e sum of $5,0i)U on each Count, On December 
,"' ' - 1988 J fo rmal judgment and s e n t e n c e p r e p a r e d and s u b m i t t e d by 
t h e S t a t e of Utah was e x e c u t e ! in . t h e Court , s p e c i f i e d t h a t 
t h e p r i s o n s e n t e n c e s i m p o s e d on C o u n t s 1 t h r o u g h 8 wet••? i, j ua 
c u n i u r g e n t l y w i t h e a c h o t h e r and o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t t o p a y 
r e s t i t u t i o n i • :•>•• - / i r t i m s in t he amo;"' r * '• ?9 ; , - r -^ ,23. 
N o t i c e of A p p e a l was d u l y and t i r a e l - t i 1 ^d w i t h t h e 
C o u r t <»ii j a . i . • . — I R . i s ? ) ; can • >-. December 1 9 , 1988 J u d g e 
S o r e n s o n s i g n e d a c e r t i f i c a t e or : ,,
 : b 1 e C a u s e a11d O r d e r 
a d r a i t t i n g d e f e n d a n t t o b a i l pend ing a p p e a l (R. 203) . 
0*> • - • i J* * . e R i c h a r d C. Howe g r a n t e d 
a p p e l l a n t ' s mo t ion t o w i t h d r a w h i s bond •. • e r ed a p p e l l a n t to 
s u r r e n d e r h i m s e l f t o t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n on or b e f o r e T h u r s d a y , 
A u g u s t 10 , 1989 . A p p e l l d . - . p l i e d w i t h t i l a t o r d e r and i s 
p r e s e n t l y s e r v i n g h i s s e n t e n c e . 
FACTS 
5!^5iiE2H1 2~ 5JL e n 2il!3 Jl!}2• Bingham tes11 f led that he was 
hired Oj American Factoring to sell promissory notes that it was 
offering t» hlv: public pursuant to a registration statement under 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act in approximately September of 1982 
(Tr. 1-18-21). He testified that Michael Moore told him that 
American Fdcloi in
 ( ^ \ : i i I the business of buying accounts 
receivable and notes receivable from othei hu/. i nesses, that 
5 
*hereafter the "Tr." designation shall refer to the transcript of 
proceedings. The roman numeral preceding a slash specifies the trans-
cript volumes; and the arabic numbers specify the relevant pages thereo 
American loaned money to such businesses, and that the company 
also made real estate loans (Tr. 1-19). Moore was the president 
of the company (Tr. 1-22). 
Bingham accepted the job and began selling promissory 
notes for American Factoring, most of them in the Uintah Basin 
(Tr. 1-22). During the succeeding six or seven months he sold 
promissory notes to all of the alleged victims in this case, as 
follows: 
Date 
October 11, 1982 
October 26, 1982 
October 28, 1982 
November 15, 1982 
December 28, 1982 
January 14, 1983 
February 25, 1983 
April 15, 1983 
Appellant concedes that the dates of each sale as they 
are specified in the Second Amended Information (R. 99-105) are 
accurate. Appellant further concedes that when called to testify 
in support of Count I of the information Earl Thacker testified 
that Glen Bingham made to him the statement specified in paragraph 
9(a) through 9(e) of the Affidavit of Probable Cause filed by 
Ronald E. Miller on October 5, 1987 before Whitney D. Hammond, 
Count 
Count I 
Count II 
Count III 
Count IV 
Count V 
Count VI 
Count VII 
Count VIII 
Earl & Colleen Thacker 
Dean & Velma Frandsen 
George & Elva Weedig 
Marion & Eulla Southam 
Gale & Sharon Wilkins 
Melvin & Lola White 
Ronald & Bonnie Bryson 
Clyde & Irma Collins 
Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court (R. 17). Appellant also 
concedes that Glen Bingham made the statements set forth in 
paragraphs 11(a) through (c), 13(a) through (c), 17(a) through 
(c) , 19(a) through (c) , 21(a) through (f), 23(a) through (d) and 
paragraphs 25(a) through (e) of the Affidavit of Probable Cause 
(R. 13-17) to the various other investors named in succeeding 
Counts II through VIII of the Information. 
Mr. Bingham admitted that he had sold American Factoring 
notes to each of the foregoing persons (Tr. 1-24) , and testified 
that in connection with his presentation to the buyers, he told 
them that American Factoring was engaged in "factoring accounts 
receivable and notes receivable and real estate notes and those 
things and that they were charging quite a high rate of 
interest on them as a result they were able to pay high rates of 
interest" to the note holders (Tr. 1-25). He also told them that 
American Factoring took collateral to secure all of the money it 
provided on the strength of such assets, including the accounts 
themselves, as well as real property as additional security (Tr. 
1-26). He claimed to have told them that the collateral would 
have at least a two to one value over what the note purchasers 
were investing in American Factoring (Tr. 1-26). He identified a 
prospectus on American Factoring dated September 13, 1982; and 
stated that he had reviewed the contents thereof with each of the 
note purchasers in detail (Tr. 1-27-28 as modified at Tr. 1-31, 
7 
36). He said that the only thing he told the investors beyond 
what was represented in the prospectus was that their notes would 
be collateralized; and that he did only after he personally 
confirmed the fact by reviewing trust deeds and appraisals on the 
properties pledged (Tr. 1-29). He conceded that Moore did not 
give him authority to mention collateral to the investors; and 
insisted that Moore told him he was not to use any information 
beyond that set forth in the prospectus (Tr. 1-29-30). He 
testified that from his perspective, the type of factoring being 
done by American Factoring was slightly different than normal 
because American Factoring was dealing in notes receivable as well 
as current accounts (Tr. 1-32). 
On cross-examination Bingham reiterated that he was 
urged to stick very closely to the prospectus in making sales 
presentations because the prospectus1 had been prepared to meet 
the obligations of the securities rules (Tr. 1-35). He also 
indicated that his statement that investor funds would be 
indirectly collateralized at a rate of at least two to one was 
corroborated by the information set forth in audited financial 
statements which Bingham had perused (Tr. 1-37). In response to 
questions from defense counsel Bingham review a number of 
statements set forth in the prospectus dated September 13f 1982 
(Exhibit 3) which he reviewed in detail with each investor 
including 
8 
1. Clear notice that the investments were 
speculative (page 5). 
2. An expanded definition of the word 
"factoring" which would include the collection of 
"notes" as well as accounts, and notice that the 
company intended to engage in businesses aside from 
factoring including, but not limited to, "asset 
secured financial services" (pages 10 through 13). 
Bingham also testified that Moore never told him that 
all of the investor funds would be indirectly collateralized at a 
rate of four to one: and indicated that he did not tell Moore that 
he was making representations about collateral ratios. (Tr. 1-45). 
Bingham also testified that to his knowledge Michael Moore never 
talked to any of the note purchasers named in the Information 
before they invested their money (Tr. 1-46). 
On redirect examination Bingham conceded that he was 
aware that American Factoring was loaning money on a real estate 
development in Cedar City, but did not recall whether he mentioned 
the name of the developers to the investors (Tr. 1-49-50). He 
stated that he was not aware that American Factoring had 
effectively stopped its business of financing current accounts 
receivable prior to the note sales specified in the Information 
(Tr. 1-52). 
Z£i!J:ilB2-D^  2l £:±I±Ql ^Ll^t^t. M s* ? ri e s t testified that 
she was employed as a secretary at American Factoring some time in 
1981; that she prepared documents and performed general filing, 
secretarial and accounting duties for the company (Tr. 1-55-56); 
9 
and that Michael Moore ran the company and made all the decisions 
(Tr. 1-57). She stated that to her knowledge, no employee of 
American Factoring was involved in soliciting accounts receivable 
to purchase (Tr, 1-58) and that only Michael Moore undertook any 
responsibility to collect the notes which were factored by the 
company (Tr. 1-51). She also testified concerning a relationship 
between American Factoring and "M Management", a corporation owned 
by Michael Moore which received monthly payments of $5,000 from 
American Factoring (Tr. 1-66-68). 
On cross-examination Ms. Priest was questioned 
concerning the transactions between American Factoring and 
Lanseair represented by the documents in evidence, and summarized 
the transaction as a loan of money to Lanseair Corporation on the 
strength of invoices evidencing debt due and owing from Lynn 
Bogart to Lanseair, collateralized by real property (Tr. 1-85-87). 
She stated that she typed up the underlying invoices on 
instructions of either Lynn Bogart, Paul Jeppsen or Michael Moore 
(Tr. 1-60). At Tr. 1-90-91, Ms. Priest testified that on some 
occasions she filled out such Lanseair invoices at the direct 
instruction of Mr. Moore who instructed her as to the amount of 
money to be represented by the invoice. 
T^ J^tJ.mon^  of George M^ Llle.r. George Miller testified 
that he was employed by American Factoring from February 19, 1983 
through July of 1983 as a bookkeeper (Tr. II-5), and that 
10 
defendant Moore was the president of the company (Tr. II-6). He 
said that to his perception American Factoring was not 
realistically involved in the business of factoring current 
accounts receivable but did engage in real estate loans (Tr. II-
8). He testified that by February of 1983 the only source of 
revenue to American Factoring was investor monies (Tr. 11-15); and 
that the uses to which the money was put was to make additional 
loans and pay interest due on outstanding notes (Tr. 11-16)/ and 
that this circumstance persisted through July of 1983. By way of 
summary, Miller testified that American Factoring would loan money 
to businesses on the basis of "sales and assignments of accounts 
receivable" of debts due and owing to the debtor business; that 
the debtor business would pledge interests in real property to 
American by way of trust deeds or quit claim deeds (used to avoid 
legal foreclosure) as additional security (Tr. 11-26-28); and that 
sometimes the underlying debt purchased by or pledged to American 
was represented by promissory notes rather than current accounts 
receivable (Tr. 11-28). Miller testified that he became concerned 
because American Factoring did not make any efforts to collect the 
underlying notes or other obligations owed to its debtor clients 
(Tr. 11-34). He testified that the company ceased raising funds 
by the sale of notes in May of 1983 (Tr. 11-39-40). 
I^st^mon^ oj: Ma£k Wood. Mr. Wood testified that from 
1981 through 1983 he was operating a business known as 
11 
Teleproductions which was engaged in the production of movies, 
filmstrips and other entertainment properties, and which owned 
real property in the State of Nevada (Tr. 11-50). He testified 
that made an agreement with Michael Moore under which American 
Factoring would provide approximately $300,000 in short-term 
financing at high interest rates over a period of 90 days, and 
that thereafter, Moore would replace that short-term financing 
with a long-term funding commitment to be used to construct a 
resort on Wood's Nevada property (Tr. 11-53). He said in exchange 
for the money, his companies made promissory notes in favor of 
American Factoring (Tr. 11-54-55), and that additionally, he 
pledged 1,000 acres of the Lincoln County, Nevada land to 
American by way of a grant deed (Tr. 11-55). He testified that 
some time later, this property was reconveyed to the Woods 
Enterprises and replaced with promissory notes which Wood owned. 
Z§JiJ:i:I!}2i}.Z 2^ J^^i £^£J?i!i:I!* Paul Jeppsen testified that 
in April or May of 1981, after having been requested by Lynn 
Bogart to find a source of financing for his real estate ventures, 
Jeppsen introduced Bogart to Michael Moore, who had previously 
told him that American Factoring had money available from its 
factoring business (Tr. 11-219). According to Jeppsen, Bogart 
told Moore that he was looking to purchase distressed real estate 
at sheriff's sales that could be resold with no down payments at a 
profit and that he needed funds with which to purchase the initial 
12 
titles (Tr. 11-221). Jeppsen apparently told Bogart that American 
was in the business of factoring and inquired as to whether 
Lanseair had accounts receivable which could be factored with 
American Factoring, and suggested that Bogart identify some 
particular properties on which to make proposals (Tr. 11-221). 
Lanseair corporation was, according to Jeppsen, the real estate 
company through which Bogart operated (Tr. 11-223). He testified 
that shortly thereafter, American Factoring began loaning money to 
Lanseair. Trial Exhibits 38 through 42 are a series of loan 
document packages evidencing these transactions which continued 
between May 28, 1981 and April 1, 1982. Jeppsen testified 
particularly concerning trial Exhibit 40, a representative loan 
package. Beginning at page 3, the package contains a "Sale and 
Assignment of Accounts Receivable and Repurchase Agreement" 
reciting that Lanseair has conveyed to American Factoring certain 
invoices of a cumulative value of $80,000 in exchange for $50,000. 
Jeppsen testified that he and Bogart executed this document, but 
that the invoices referenced on the face of the sale and 
assignment were made up at the offices of American Factoring by 
either himself or a secretary from information given to him by 
Bogart, and which Jeppsen said he felt did not represent bona fide 
obligations from Bogart to Lanseair (Tr. 11-227-231), though he 
did not recall any conversation in which this lack of bona fides 
was conveyed to Moore (Tr. 11-231). Jeppsen also testified that 
13 
he and Bogart executed the continuing guarantee of payments of 
receivables found as pages 1 and 2 of Exhibit 40 to manifest he 
and Bogart's individual obligation to insure the payment of the 
account receivable assigned by Lanseair to American as collateral 
for the debt (Tr. 11-227). Jeppsen testified that though money 
was repaid to American Factoring by Lanseair, all such payments 
came from monies deposited into the Lanseair account which was 
provided by American Factoring (Tr. 11-232). 
On cross-examination Jeppsen testified to the manner in 
which he was introduced to Lynn Bogart and that Bogart was very 
effective in convincing people of his bona fides and skill in real 
estate matters (Tr. 11-237). He further testified that when 
Bogart told Moore he wanted loans to fund his real estate 
packages, Moore called Brian McGavin, a certified public 
accountant, who came to the offices of American Factoring and 
instructed Moore that the transactions should be structured on the 
basis of the assignments of accounts receivable so as to make them 
factoring transactions (Tr. 11-239-40). 
I^st^mony 2^ i.ZI}n 222^£i* T h e s t a t e then called Lynn 
Bogart who after admitting that he has been convicted of a series 
of felony offenses in various United States courts (Tr. 11-244), 
testified that after having instructed Paul Jeppsen to find 
sources of funds for financing of distressed real property 
transactions, he was introduced to Michael Moore (Tr. 11-247). He 
14 
testified that upon meeting Moore and describing the nature of the 
proposed business, he asked Moore if he was able to loan money on 
real property (Tr. 11-249), but that Moore wanted to talk to his 
lawyer or accountant to see if it could be done (Tr, 11-249). A 
short time later Moore told him he could do the transactions but 
wanted a Utah property as the first project. At that point, 
Jeppsen set up Lanseair Corporation in Utah as the vehicle through 
which to enter into the transactions (Tr. 11-250). Exhibit 38 was 
introduced as the loan documents reflecting the first such 
transaction (Tr. 11-253). The first document is a continuing 
guarantee of payment of receivable, and the second is the typical 
Sale and Assignment of Accounts Receivable and Repurchase 
Agreement. The document reflects the sale by Lanseair of account 
receivable in the sum of $84,500 to American Factoring Corporation 
in exchange for $65,000. Bogart testified that Michael Moore 
filled in the information on that document at his office and that 
the attached invoices were prepared at Moore's request using a 
Lanseair stamp that Moore instructed him to procure (Tr. 11-254). 
The invoices claim that Lynn Bogart owes Lanseair various sums for 
services rendered (Tr. 11-254). Bogart testified that he pledged 
a piece of property owned by his mother-in-law in Bountiful, Utah 
to secure the transaction (Tr. 11-256). Bogart says he told Moore 
he had no bona fide accounts receivable (Tr. 11-259). He further 
testified that the subsequent transactions were entered into on 
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the same basis, with the exception that the property pledged was 
different (Tr. 11-260). He testified that in some case he did not 
receive the money indicated on the loan documents (Tr, 11-264), 
because they represented new documents including accrued interest. 
He testified that in sum, he received $800,000 to $900,000 from 
American Factoring (Tr, 11-268) and that none of the money 
Lanseair paid back came from any source besides more loans from 
American Factoring (Tr. 11-269). Bogart admitted that though the 
property appraisals showed significant equity values, the actual 
market values of the property was probably no more than one-fourth 
the amount loaned on them (Tr. 11-279). He further testified that 
he had nothing to do with the transaction in which Mark Wood 
property was conveyed to Lanseair and subsequently pledged it to 
American Factoring Corporation to secure Lanseair indebtedness, 
but testified that Moore engineered the transaction so he could 
present to his auditors a better collateral ratio for Lanseair 
(Tr. 11-286). 
On cross-examination Bogart acknowledged executing 
Exhibit 66, a note in favor of Eugene Davis, Exhibit 67, a note in 
favor of Hansen Financial Services, and Exhibit 65, a note in 
favor of Ron McKeen, all of which were subsequently purchased by 
American Factoring (Tr. 111-33-34) from other customers of the 
firm. He also admitted having provided phony appraisals to 
American Factoring to support the indebtedness (Tr. 111-36-39). 
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He also agreed that he signed audit confirmations for American 
Factoring's accountants which attested to the validity and bona 
fides of the transactions (Tr. 111-44-45). The Eugene Davis note 
and deed Exhibit 66 ended up as additional collateral for 
Lanseair . 
Te^jtJ.mon^ of Harold Ja^ penjLt J£. Mr. Dent testified 
that from 1981 through 1983 he and his brother Douglas were in 
the business of real estate development, doing business as Dent & 
Associates, a proprietorship owned by his brother Douglas Dent 
(Tr. 11-94-95). He testified that he and his brother were also 
principles in entities known as "Skyline West" and "Sunrise West 
International Corporation" (Tr. 11-95). He identified trial 
Exhibit 33-A as a joint venture proposal for the development of 
1280 acres located near Cedar City, Utah, and testified that 
Michael Moore agreed in principle to provide financing to the 
enterprise on the basis outlined in the agreement (Tr. 11-100). 
They were interested in this property for potential oil 
exploration and the expectation that MX missile cites would be 
located in Iron County, Utah (Tr. 11-104). Dent testified that at 
the beginning of his fiscal relationship with American Factoring, 
it was intended that they would first enter into a series of 
interest bearing promissory notes which would subsequently be 
converted into an equity partnership in the real property pursuant 
to the joint venture proposal (Tr. 11-108). 
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Dent t hen p r o c e e d e d t o p r o v i d e d e t a i l s of t he d e b t 
t r a n s a c t i o n s pursuan t to which American Fac to r ing provided money 
to Dent & A s s o c i a t e s . The f i r s t ins t rument reviewed was Exhib i t 
3 3 , a d o c u m e n t e n t i t l e d " S a l e and A s s i g n m e n t of A c c o u n t s 
Receivable and Repurchase Agreement", dated in J u l y , 1981, which 
purpor ted to e s t a b l i s h t h a t Dent & Assoc i a t e s had sold to American 
Fac to r ing Corpora t ion c e r t a i n no tes or o ther debt i n s t rumen t s owed 
t o Dent & A s s o c i a t e s ; bu t s t a t e d t h a t in J u l y of 1981 , Dent & 
A s s o c i a t e s d id no t a c t u a l l y have any n o t e s or o t h e r a c c o u n t s 
r e c e i v a b l e to s e l l t o American F a c t o r i n g (Tr. 1 1 - 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 ) . Dent 
went on to t e s t i f y t h a t page 7 of Exhib i t 33 i s a promissory note 
in t h e face amount of $150,000 by which Douglas Dent , for Dent & 
A s s o c i a t e s , promised to pay t h a t amount to American Fac to r ing with 
i n t e r e s t . Jay Dent t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s i s the i n s t r u m e n t upon 
which American F a c t o r i n g a c t u a l l y r e l i e d in p r o v i d i n g money to 
Dent & A s s o c i a t e s (Tr. 11-109). He a l so i d e n t i f i e d page 9 of t h a t 
Exh ib i t as the Warranty Deed d e l i v e r e d as s e c u r i t y for repayment 
of t he loan (Tr. 1 1 - 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 ) . At page 5 of E x h i b i t 33 i s a 
document e n t i t l e d "Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s " p u r s u a n t to which the 
p r o m i s s o r y n o t e and w a r r a n t y deed were p l a c e d in the c u s t o d y of 
G u a r a n t y T i t l e Company wi th i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t t he Deed was to be 
r e c o r d e d o n l y upon n o t i c e of d e f a u l t in r e p a y m e n t of t h e 
p r o m i s s o r y n o t e . Dent t e s t i f i e d t h a t the p u r p o s e for e s c r o w i n g 
t h e Deed r a t h e r t han s i m p l y r e c o r d i n g i t was t o f a c i l i t a t e 
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a d d i t i o n a l f inancing of Dent & A s s o c i a t e s , appa ren t ly by keeping 
t h e r e c o r d t i t l e c l e a r of e x t r a n e o u s i n s t r u m e n t s (Tr. 1 1 - 1 1 0 ) . 
Dent t e s t i f i e d t h a t during the course of bus iness between American 
Fac to r ing and Dent & A s s o c i a t e s , a d d i t i o n a l loans were procured, 
and t h a t s i m i l a r s e r i e s of documents were e x e c u t e d in r e s p e c t 
the reof (Tr. 11-113). In r e s p e c t of subsequent loans en te red i n to 
i n mid and l a t e J u l y of 1 9 8 1 , Dent i n d i c a t e d t h a t Dent & 
A s s o c i a t e s d id not have any n o t e s r e c e i v a b l e from t h i r d - p a r t i e s 
which could be ass igned to American Fac tor ing pursuant to the s a l e 
and ass ignment of accounts r e c e i v a b l e and repurchase agreements 
( T r . 1 1 - 1 3 ) . The S t a t e a l s o i n t r o d u c e d E x h i b i t 36a wh ich 
conta ined a l e t t e r of i n t e n t executed by Moore which contemplated 
t r a n s f e r of the loan t r a n s a c t i o n s to equ i ty c o n t r i b u t i o n s (Tr, I I -
116) . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e l e t t e r of i n t e n t , t he j o i n t v e n t u r e 
p a r t n e r s h i p never m a t e r i a l i z e d (Tr. 11-148). 
Dent then t e s t i f i e d concerning a s e r i e s of t r a n s a c t i o n s 
of which t h e document s found in E x h i b i t 34 a r e t y p i c a l (Tr. I I I -
136), which d i f f e r e d from the t r a n s a c t i o n exempl i f ied by Exhib i t 
33 in t h a t t h e r e a r e a c t u a l p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s a t t a c h e d to the 
a s s ignmen t s ; in t h i s case a note from Sunr ise West I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
C o r p o r a t i o n to Dent & A s s o c i a t e s (Tr . 1 1 - 1 3 6 ) . Dent t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t of t he t w e l v e to e i g h t e e n d i f f e r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s w i th 
American F a c t o r i n g , a p p r o x i m a t e l y the f i r s t s i x i n c l u d e d a 
p u r p o r t e d t h i r d - p a r t y o b l i g a t i o n in favor of Dent & A s s o c i a t e s 
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(Tr. 11-137). However, he testified that all the promissory notes 
were executed at Moore's direction, and that in no such case, was 
there a real debt due and owing from Sunrise West or any other 
entity to the Dent Enterprise (Tr. 11-137). 
After having related a number of the other loans, Dent 
testified that of the subsequent transactions, the bulk of the 
funds loaned by American Factoring were returned to it as interest 
on prior obligations (Tr. 11-145-146). In summary he testified 
that between July 1, 1981 and August of 1982, American Factoring 
advanced to Dent & Associates approximately $500,000, but that in 
light of the high interest rates, Dent & Associates may have ended 
up owing American Factoring up to $5,000,000 (Tr. 11-147). He 
also testified that some of the interest payments made to 
American Factoring came from sources other than additional loans 
from that company (Tr. 11-148). 
On cross-examination Dent indicated that though the 
third-party notes purportedly assigned to American Factoring were 
not bona fide, some of them were guaranteed by third-parties 
unrelated to Dent & Associates (Tr. 11-152-154). He also conceded 
that he was aware of the obligations of American Factoring to its 
investors and that he participated in tailoring the documentation 
behind the American/Dent transactions to comport with those 
requirements (Tr. 11-158). He also agreed that the escrow 
instruction device on the trust deeds was not intended to 
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facilitate cheating the investors (Tr. 11-161), and agreed that 
Dent & Associates repaid monies from independent sources to 
American Factoring for nearly a year after the last funds were 
received from American (Tr. 11-162). Additionally, he testified 
that bona fide attempts were made to obtain the funding which 
could lead to establishment of the equity joint venture between 
the two companies, and clearly testified that the terms of the 
letter of intent related to the joint venture contemplated full 
payment of the debt owed by Dent & Associates to American prior to 
initiation of the joint venture phase (Tr. 11-165-166). He 
further indicated that certain funding was actually procured in 
furtherance of that goal (Tr. 11-167 et seq.). He testified that 
at the beginning of the transaction, his estimate of the value of 
the property was far in excess of the American indebtedness, but 
that the burden of increasing indebtedness at extraordinarily high 
rates ultimately resulted in the properties declining in net worth 
far below the principle and interest due on the loans (Tr. 11-171-
2). He further testified that American Factoring ultimately sued 
Dent & Associates and that certain participants in Dent & 
Associates consented to the entry of judgment for the full amount 
of money due (Tr. 11-179). 
On recross-examination Mr. Dent identified Exhibits 58 
through 64 as the third-party promissory notes which Dent & 
Associates had assigned to American in the first half dozen 
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t r a n s a c t i o n s be tween the two e n t i t i e s (Tr . 1 1 - 1 3 5 ) . He a l s o 
conceded t h a t t h e p u r p o s e for t he l a t e r t r a n s a c t i o n s in which 
t h i r d - p a r t y no tes had not been ass igned to American was to " ro le 
o v e r " a c c r u e d i n t e r e s t and n o t i n c u r a d d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p a l 
indeb tedness (Tr. 11-189). F i n a l l y , he t e s t i f i e d t h a t the Dent & 
Assoc i a t e s equ i t y in the p rope r ty was e f f e c t i v e l y des t royed by an 
o b l i g a t i o n in favor of Mateo , from whom Dent had borrowed money 
p a r t of which was repaid to American F a c t o r i n g , in the amount of 
$2,400,000 (Tr, 11-191), and t h a t Dent & Assoc ia t e s was cheated in 
the Mateo t r a n s a c t i o n because Mateo folded before i t had provided 
a l l the f inanc ing i t had agreed to provide in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
r e a l p rope r ty mortgage i t rece ived (Tr. 11-193) • 
Test^mon^ caf Mlch^e^l 5 2 ^ £ ^ # Michael Howery t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t he r e p r e s e n t e d T e l e p r o d u c t i o n s , a c o r p o r a t i o n c o n t r o l l e d by 
Mark Wood, in a s e r i e s of t r a n s a c t i o n s w i th American F a c t o r i n g 
Corpora t ion (Tr. 11-204). He i d e n t i f i e d Exh ib i t 32 as a s e r i e s of 
p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s f r o m t h i r d - p a r t i e s d u e and o w i n g t o 
T e l e p r o d u c t i o n s which were a s s i g n e d t o s e c u r e t h e i n i t i a l 
i n d e b t e d n e s s of T e l e p r o d u c t i o n s to American F a c t o r i n g , v i a 
American's t y p i c a l s a l e and ass ignment of accounts r e c e i v a b l e and 
repurchase agreement forms (Tr. 11-204). He t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r 
t h e i n i t i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , a d d i t i o n a l f u n d s w e r e l o a n e d t o 
Te lep roduc t ions by American Fac tor ing wi thout the assignment of 
any a c c o u n t s r e c e i v a b l e , on t h e b a s i s of d i s c o u n t e d p r o m i s s o r y 
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notes (Tr. 11-206), and that these sums were personally guaranteed 
by Mark Wood (Tr. 11-206). As in the case of the Dent 
transactions, these transactions were secured by real property 
(Tr. 11-207). Howery also conceded that he executed a deed 
conveying property owned by Mark Wood to Lanseair Corporation, 
which subsequently conveyed the same property to American 
Factoring to secure indebtedness in favor of American Factoring 
which was incurred by Lanseair (Tr. 11-213). 
T^tiraon^ °j[ 2£i£I! M£G^j.n. Mr. McGavin testified that 
he met Mr. Moore in 1981 and acted as his accountant during the 
ensuing period. He testified that as an employee of Hansen, 
Barnett & Maxwell, CPA's, he audited the financial statement of 
American Factoring for the year-end March 31, 1982 and that he did 
so pursuant to an audit program (Tr. 111-61). The audit program 
and underlying work records were admitted as Exhibit 74 (Tr. III-
64). He testified that contrary to the State's assertion, 
American Factoring did perform traditional factoring services for 
a number of companies, though the volume of those transactions was 
not great (Tr. 11-71). He further attested that he sent 
confirmation requests to Dent & Associates and Lanseair to confirm 
the bona ^des of the notes and accounts factored with American, 
and that both companies signed and returned the confirmations (Tr. 
III-74-5). He testified that his firm reported to American 
Factoring Company that the real property pledged to secure the 
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i n d e b t e d n e s s of L a n s e a i r was va lued 2.39 t i m e s the i n d e b t e d n e s s 
(Tr. I X I - 7 9 ) , and t h a t t h e I r o n County land exceeded D e n t ' s 
indeb tedness by almost 4 t imes (Tr, 111-80). 
McGavin t e s t i f i e d t h a t by the aud i t per iod ending March 
31 , 1983 t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e doubt as to whether the Lanseai r 
o b l i g a t i o n s were c o l l e c t i b l e (Tr. 1 1 1 - 8 6 ) . D i s c l o s u r e of t h a t 
p r o p o s i t i o n was s e t fo r th in the f i n a n c i a l s t a t emen t which he knew 
had b e e n c i r c u l a t e d t o n o t e h o l d e r s ( T r . 1 1 1 - 8 7 ) . A f t e r 
d i s c u s s i o n , a r e p o r t t o t h a t e f f e c t was made and A m e r i c a n 
F a c t o r i n g s t o p p e d r a i s i n g money from n o t e h o l d e r s (Tr. I I I -
92,94) . 
McGavin t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was not m a t e r i a l to the 
f i n a n c i a l w e l l - b e i n g of t h e company t h a t American F a c t o r i n g had 
been engaged more in r e a l e s t a t e f i n a n c i n g than i t had f u l l 
s e r v i c e f a c t o r i n g of bona f ide accounts r e c e i v a b l e s (Tr. 111-98). 
F i n a l l y , Mr. McGavin t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g the p e r i o d of h i s 
o p e r a t i o n of American F a c t o r i n g , Michael Moore did not accumulate 
s i g n i f i c a n t a s s e t s or w i t h d r a w any e x t r a o r d i n a r y sums of money 
from the firm (Tr. 111-46,47). 
3!^^ii:IB2i}^ 2J: kee Fej . t . Lee F e i t was c a l l e d by the 
d e f e n s e and t e s t i f i e d t h a t in 1981 or 1982 h i s b u s i n e s s f a c t o r e d 
bona f ide accounts r e c e i v a b l e with American Fac to r ing Corpora t ion 
(Tr. I I I -115) and t h a t he repaid the indebtedness as requ i red (Tr. 
I I I - 1 2 3 ) . 
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5!^5il!D2i}^ 2l M i l l a r d i l?l5]2^^1son, Mr. M i c h a e l s o n 
a p p e a r e d as an o f f i c e r and d i r e c t o r of American F a c t o r i n g and 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t to h i s p e r c e p t i o n , the a f f a i r s of the bus iness were 
c o n d u c t e d in a r e a s o n a b l e f a s h i o n which was c o n s i s t e n t w i th t he 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made to i n v e s t o r s (Tr. I I I - 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ) . 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Court should rule that the four-year 
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s e s tab l i shed by Sect ion 
71-1-302(1) i s appl icable to S e c u r i t i e s Fraud 
v i o l a t i o n s and d i smiss the Information herein 
because i t was not f i l e d within that period. 
As t h e Cour t can see from t h e l i s t of c h a r g e s and d a t e s 
found in t he I n f o r m a t i o n , each of t he o f f e n s e s a r o s e from f a c t s 
which o c c u r r e d more than four bu t l e s s than f i v e y e a r s p r i o r t o 
the da te upon which the o r i g i n a l Informat ion here in was f i l ed in 
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Th i s f a c t r a i s e s for t he f i r s t t i m e b e f o r e 
any a p p e l l a t e cour t in t h i s S t a t e the i s sue r a i sed by the c o n f l i c t 
between Sect ion 61 -1 -21 , U.C.A. (quoted sugra) which provides for 
a f ive year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s for c r i m i n a l p ro secu t i ons under 
t h e Utah S e c u r i t i e s Ac t , and t h e p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 7 6 - 1 -
302(1)(a) which p r o v i d e s a four year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n for 
felony p r o s e c u t i o n s (a lso quoted sujora). 
Though t h i s m a t t e r was not r a i s e d in the Cour t be low, 
a p p e l l a n t r e s p e c t f u l l y c o n t e n d s t h a t b e c a u s e v i o l a t i o n of t h e 
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applicable statute of limitations is a matter which is sufficient 
to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to try the charged offenses, 
Rule 12(b) and the ancillary provisions of Rule 12(f), U.R.Cr.p. 
(Chapter 35 of Title 77, U.S.C.) permit the issue to be raised 
here for the first time. 
It is the position of Michael Moore that the four year 
statue of limitations set forth in Section 76-1-302 (1) (a) is 
clearly applicable to all crimes designated felonies under the 
laws of the State of Utah "except as otherwise provided ^n thjLs 
£a£t". There is no provision in TjLtle 7j5j- the Utah Crj.mj.nal 
Code, which could operate to exclude fraud in the sale of 
securities from the class of offenses to which Section 76-1-
302(1) (a) is applicable. As a result, there is a direct conflict 
between Section 76 - 1-302(1) ( a) which provides a four year 
limitation on felony prosecutions, and Section 61-1-21 which 
purports to provide a five year statute for securities fraud 
prosecutions. 
In light of this obvious conflict, one must go to 
General Rules of Statutory Interpretation to determine the 
controlling intent of the Legislature. 
The State is expected to argue that the provisions of 
Section 61-1-21 merely stand as an exception to the general 
statute of limitation provision contained in the criminal code 
notwithstanding the failure of the Legislature to include any 
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language therein suggesting that this was its intent. 
This position is erroneous. The case of Unj-jted States 
!Li l i E l l t z , 105F. Supp. 512, 513(D.N.J. 1952) involved a 
prosecution for willfully and knowingly attempting to defeat and 
evade income taxes. Tiplitz moved to dismiss the indictment on 
the ground that the following language of 18 U.S.C. Section 3282 
established a three year statue of limitations for all federal 
criminal offenses. 
law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or 
punished for any offense, not capitol, unless 
the indictment is found or the information is 
instituted within three years next after such 
offense shall have been committed. 
The government disagreed, arguing that the six year statute 
contained in 26 U.S.C. Section 3748 was controlling. That Section 
provides as follows: 
(a) Criminal Prosecutions. No person shall 
be prosecuted, tried, or punished, for any of 
the various offenses arising under the 
Internal Revenue Laws of the United States 
unless the indictment is found or the 
information instituted with three years next 
after the commission of the offense, except 
that the period of limitations shall be six 
years .. . 
(2) for the offense of willfully 
attempting in any manner to evade or 
defeat any tax or the payment thereof. 
The Court ruled that the six year statute provided in 
Section 3748 controlled by applying the following logic: 
This provision [the six year statute 
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p r o v i d e d by 26 U . S . C. , S e c t i o n 3 7 4 8 ] 
f a l l s s q u a r e l y w i t h i n t h e e x c e p t i o n which 
Congre s s was c a r e f u l to i n c l u d e as p a r t of 
T i t l e 18 U . S . C , S e c t i o n 3 2 8 2 f " e x c e p t a s 
o t h e r w i s e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d by J^w. . . " t h e 
words are c l e a r and unambiguous. Had Congress 
iDJ^i:!}^.!^ J:!}^ ^*5^PJ:j!:2J}ii U2J:i!^ ij} the s e c t i o n s 
J2i i :2^1i}3 S e c t i o n 11QZ J:2 1}^^^ k ^ i } the on ly 
would *}iLZe ^551}^ sj.mpJLe H!i*J:J:i!£ to ~2L§, the 
s5Zli}95 c^a^u^e " e x c e p t a s othejrwj.jje ££Ov^ded 
li3 i l i i J chapter.1 7 This i s not so however. As 
w o r d e d , a s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n a n y w h e r e 
e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d by law g o v e r n s . 105 F. 
Supp. a t 513 (emphasis added). 
When i t enacted Sec t ion 76-1-302(1) the Utah L e g i s l a t u r e 
c l e a r l y had the choice of phras ing the l i m i t i n g p rov i so in one of 
two ways , e i t h e r by a d o p t i n g , as i t d i d , t he l a n g u a g e " e x c e p t as 
o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d J.n t h ^ s £ ^ £ t . . . n ; or by a d o p t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e 
l a n g u a g e which would have c l e a r l y made t h e four year s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s i n a p p l i c a b l e to the many c r i m i n a l o f fenses defined by 
s e c t i o n s of the Utah Code found o u t s i d e T i t l e 76. This could have 
been e a s i l y done had the L e g i s l a t u r e followed Congress1 lead in 18 
U.S.C. § 3 2 8 2 , by p h r a s i n g t h e l i m i t i n g p r o v i s o " e x c e p t a s 
o t h e r w i s e provided by law. . ." . Having adopted the former language 
in t h e face of a c l e a r o p t i o n to do o t h e r w i s e , i t must be presumed 
t h a t t he L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d the e x c e p t i o n to the four year 
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s to app ly on ly to the l i m i t e d number of 
c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e s s e t f o r t h in the C r i m i n a l Code in T i t l e 76 of 
the laws of Utah, which provide s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s which are 
e i t h e r s h o r t e r or longer t h a t the four year pe r iod . 
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The Legislature failed to avail itself of other options 
which it has used elsewhere, which would have exempted securities 
fraud cases from operation of the four year statute. For 
instance, Chapter 37 of Title 58 of the Utah Code defines all the 
criminal offenses related to controlled substances. In that 
title, the Legislature avoided express or implied conflicts 
between the provisions of Chapter 37 of Title 58 and any other 
laws of the State of Utah by enacting Section 58-37-19, U.C.A., 
which provides as follows: 
It is the purpose of this act to regulate 
and control the substances designated within 
Section 58-37-4, and whenever the requirements 
prescribed, the offenses defined or the 
penalties imposed relating to substances 
controlled by this act shall be or appear to 
be in conflict with Title 58, Chapter 17 or 
any other laws of this State, the provisions 
of this act shall be controlling. 
The failure of the Legislature to avail itself of either 
of these options in the context of the Utah Securities Act can 
only be read to manifest its intent that Section 76-1-302 be read 
strictly according to its terms; and that where there is a 
conflict between the express language of that provision and any 
other provision of the laws of Utah related to limitation in 
criminal proceedings, the Legislature intended the four year 
statute of limitation to apply. 
Additional support for this reading is found in one of 
the venerable principles of statutory construction: the maxim, 
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"22i:££2SJ!J:2 unj.us e s t exc lu s j . o a l t e £ j . u s " ( the e x p r e s s i o n of one 
th ing i s the exc lus ion of a n o t h e r ) . In d i s c u s s i n g the na tu re and 
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e maxim t h e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e i s found in 
SuJri}2£i:^i}^ S t a t u t o r y Cons t£uc t^ ion ' S e c t i o n 47.23 ( h e r e a f t e r 
"Su the r l and , a t page " ) . 
[As t h e maxim i s a p p l i e d to s t a t u t o r y 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , where a form of c o n d u c t , t h e 
m a t t e r of i t s p e r f o r m a n c e and o p e r a t i o n , and 
the persons and t h i n g s to which i t r e f e r s are 
d e s i g n a t e d , t h e r e i s an i n f e r e n c e t h a t a l l 
o m i s s i o n s s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d a s 
e x c l u s i o n s . . . 
In t h e c a s e of e x c e p t i o n s , p r o v i s o s 
[ p r o v i s i o n s s i m i l a r t o t he f i r s t p h r a s e of 
Sec t ion 76-1-302(1)] and sav ings c l a u s e s , the 
maxim v a l i d a t e s t h e s e and o t h e r n e g a t i v e 
p r o v i s i o n s . The enun}2££J:i2I} oj: exc^usj-ons 
,££25! J:i}2 2E?£i*J:£2i} 2 i ^ s t a t u t e i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
il}2 5 i5^ i^ i2 ^]}2iij:^ i*££i^ J:2 i?H 2^i!2JI J22J: 
5£22iJ£2^i : i :2 £ i}2i :^2^* ( c i t i n g B u s h n e l l v_. 
S^£2££2£ 52 i^£^ ' 1 0 2 A r i z « 3 0 9 , 428 P.2d 
987 f989 1967) . 
Because S e c t i o n 76 -1 -302(1 ) l i m i t s a p p l i c a t i o n of t he 
l i m i t i n g language to excep t ions found in the Utah Cr iminal Code, 
i t would be a c l e a r v i o l a t i o n of t he maxim and the h i s t o r y which 
suppor t s i t to read i n to i t s l i m i t i n g p rov iso a d d i t i o n a l language 
s u f f i c i e n t to accommodate the c o n f l i c t i n g f i v e year s t a t u t e of 
Sec t ion 61 -1 -21 , wi thout a c l e a r l e g i s l a t i v e mandate to do so. 
Of s i m i l a r p e r s u a s i v e support i s the g e n e r a l l y accepted 
r u l e t h a t where t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t between s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , 
t h e l a t e r e n a c t e d s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n s s h o u l d be deemed 
c o n t r o l l i n g . In t h i s c a s e t h e Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act as 
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presently in effect was enacted by the Legislature in 1963. Ten 
years later in 1973/ the Utah Legislature completely overhauled 
the criminal laws of the State of Utah by adopting a comprehensive 
criminal code. (See Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-101 et seq. 
(1973 as amended.) The 1973 revised criminal code included the 
four year statute of limitations found in Section 76-1-302. 
Housekeeping amendments to Section 61-1-21 were enacted 
in 1983. Based on this amendment the State has tentatively 
suggested that active access by the Legislature to that provision 
in 1983 was of such a nature that for purposes of statutory 
construction in this casef Section 61-1-21 should be deemed to be 
the later adopted provision. However, that argument does not 
carry because the Legislature undertook similar amendments to 
Section 76-1-302 in 1985. Thusf if we are to look at the date of 
the amendments to the respective sections, it is still clear that 
76-1-302 is the section which provides the last enacted statute of 
limitations which might be applicable to this case. 
Utah law is clear in holding that where there is a 
conflict between statutes, the last enacted provision should 
control. State v. Shondell, 22 U.2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 147 
(19 69) ; See Murray C U y v^ Hall, 633 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). 
Finally, as a general rule, the State should be required 
to show an exception to the clear language of Section 76-1-302(1) 
if a contrary provision is to be recognized as controlling. See 
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J^iS52i2 Is. C±t% of Kansas City, 680 P.2d 877, 886 (Kan. 19 84); 
IJdall Zi S^all, 6 1 3 p* 2 d 742,745 (Okla. 1980) for the proposition 
that "exceptions should not be read into a statue which are not 
made by the legislative body." No such general mandate is found 
is Section 61-1-21. Thus, as a matter of statutory construction, 
the contrary provision of the criminal code should be deemed 
controlling . 
Beyond the Rules of Statutory Construction there is 
another, and perhaps more important reason to hold that his 
prosecution is barred by the provision of Section 76-1-302(1). 
"[I]n criminal law [statutes of limitation] create an absolute bar 
to prosecution", State v_. E|>|>e n s, 30 Wash. App. 119, 633 P.2d 92, 
96 (1981). Instate \r. Fog el, 16 Ariz. App. 246, 492 P.2d 742 
(1972), wherein the Court said: 
... a criminal statute of limitation is not a 
mere limitation on the remedy, but a 
limitation upon the power of the sovereign to 
act against the accused. 
Statutes of limitation are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the accused and against 
the prosecution. 492 P.2d at 744 (citations 
omitted). See State \r. Merolla, 686 P.2d 244, 
246 (Nev. 1984). 
A similar rule of liberal construction in favor of the 
defendant was adopted by the Kansas Court in Stajie \r. M^ LJL^ -S , 707 
P.2d 1079, 1081 (Kan. 1985) where the Court said: 
Statutes of limitation are favored by the 
law and are to be construed liberally in favor 
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of the accused and against the prosecution and 
exceptions to the statute are to be construed 
narrowly, or strictly against the State. 
We have here a case directly involving the State's claim 
that the proviso of Section 76-1-302(1) which is, by its terms, 
limited to contrary statutes found in the Criminal Code, should be 
extended and construed to permit prosecution for criminal 
securities violations to be initiated up to five years after the 
event. This argument is directly contrary to all of the 
controlling Rules of Statutory Construction and the premise of 
fundamental fairness which requires that statutes of limitation be 
strictly construed against the State. None of the reasons likely 
to be adduced by the State in favor of its argument are persuasive 
in the least. Based on the foregoing rationale, this Court should 
dismiss the Information herein as having been barred by the 
statute of limitation set forth in Section 76-1-302(1). If the 
Legislature wishes to make it clear that it desires a longer 
statute in securities cases, there are simple, unequivocal methods 
whereby that goal could be accomplished. However, that is a 
matter to be left to the Legislature. 
II 
The evidence presented at trial is not 
sufficient to support the verdicts. 
It is clear from the trial proceedings that in his 
presentation to each of the investors named in the eight counts of 
the Information, he delivered to them an American Factoring 
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prospectus like Exhibit 3, a prospectus dated September 13/ 1982/ 
which described the business of American Factoring Corporation 
(Tr. 1-27-28). See also Exhibits 11, 14/ 19/ 22/ examples of the 
prospectus presented in evidence by witnesses Southam, White, 
Bryson and Collins. Set forth prominently on the facing page of 
the prospectus is the following language: 
THESE NOTES ARE OFFERED AS A SPECULATION ONLY 
TO THE RESIDENTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
*** 
NO BROKER/ DEALER/ AGENT OR OTHER PERSON HAS 
BEEN AUTHORIZED TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT RELATIVE 
TO THESE PROMISSORY NOTES OTHER THAN THOSE 
CONTAINED IN THIS PROSPECTUS. 
On page 3 t h e p r o s p e c t u s r e c i t e s t h a t : 
U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e i n d i c a t e d / t h e 
i n f o r m a t i o n in t h i s p r o s p e c t u s s p e a k s o n l y of 
i t s d a t e ( s i c ) r and n e i t h e r d e l i v e r y h e r e o f 
nor any s a l e s made h e r e u n d e r s h a l l c r e a t e any 
i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e a f f a i r s , a s s e t s o r 
l i a b i l i t i e s of t h e c o m p a n y h a v e c o n t i n u e d 
w i t h o u t c h a n g e s i n c e t h e d a t e o f t h i s 
p r o s p e c t u s . No u n d e r w r i t e r , d e a l e r , s a l e s m a n 
o r o t h e r p e r s o n h a s b e e n a u t h o r i z e d t o g i v e 
any i n f o r m a t i o n o r made any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
o t h e r t h a n t h o s e c o n t a i n e d in t h i s o f f e r i n g 
c i r c u l a r . I n f o r m a t i o n or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s not 
h e r e i n c o n t a i n e d , i f g i v e n o r m a d e , m u s t n o t 
be r e l i e d upon as hav ing been a u t h o r i z e d . 
B e g i n n i n g a t p a g e 5 of t h e p r o s p e c t u s i s a s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d 
" I n t r o d u c t o r y S t a t e m e n t and S p e c u l a t i v e A s p e c t s " which b e g i n s w i th 
t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h : 
A m e r i c a n F a c t o r i n g C o r p o r a t i o n ( t h e 
"company") i s a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , hav ing been 
i n c o r p o r a t e d A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 8 1 . The p r i m a r y 
p u r p o s e of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ha s been t o engage 
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in t he b u s i n e s s of " f a c t o r i n g , " a b u s i n e s s 
a c t i v i t y w h e r e b y t h e company i n t e n d s t o 
p u r c h a s e n o t e s and a c c o u n t s r e c e i v a b l e of 
o t h e r b u s i n e s s e s a t a d i s c o u n t w i t h t h e 
i n t e n t i o n of mak ing a p r o f i t from t h e 
c o l l e c t i o n of t h o s e n o t e s and a c c o u n t s . The 
22I?£^I}2 ^1^2 ^rijtend^ t o use a JDO£tj.on of t h e s e 
ii^Di^i! ^2 22H^i^2i ^ ^ ^ 2 ^ Z 5 ^ 2 H £ 2 ^ ^J-n^j^cJ-a^l 
5 2 £ ^ i 2 ^ ^ ^ t h Jbja^ s^ i n e^ s^ s e n t j . t j . e s ^ whj.ch 
i!.!r£vj:ces ™$X J-jicj-^ud^ such act iviJt j .es a j majcj-ji^ g 
2l !>$.£}*£*:§. l2^I2i ! ' f i n a n c i n g of l e a s i n g 
a c t i v i t i e s and inventory f i n a n c i n g . 
The n o t i o n t h a t A m e r i c a n F a c t o r i n g n o t e s were 
s p e c u l a t i v e s e c u r i t i e s i s a g a i n r e i t e r a t e d on page 6 of the 
p r o s p e c t u s ; and t h i s s t a t e m e n t i s f o l l o w e d by n o t i c e t h a t t he 
o b l i g a t i o n s a r e n o t s e c u r e d or g u a r a n t e e d , and a r e n o t 
c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t , bu t s i m p l e e v i d e n c e s of i n d e b t e d n e s s . 
There follow a number of warnings about the s p e c u l a t i v e na ture of 
t h e b u s i n e s s , the p o t e n t i a l c a s h - f l o w p r o b l e m s to the company 
imposed by o f fe r ing high i n t e r e s t debt s e c u r i t i e s , the fac t t h a t 
t he company i s u n r e g u l a t e d , and the f a c t t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no 
m a r k e t for t h e n o t e s . ( E x h i b i t 3 , pages 7 and 8.) 
There i s f u r t h e r l anguage r e l a t e d to the " b u s i n e s s of 
t h e company" b e g i n n i n g a t page 10 of the p r o s p e c t u s in which 
p o t e n t i a l i n v e s t o r s are given c l e a r no t i ce t h a t "the company has , 
s ince i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , conducted i t s bus iness as an a s s e t - s e c u r e d 
^Ai3ii]}fEi^i JE^I^^ce .E^IDS^i}^•.•". I t shou ld a l s o be noted t h a t each 
t i m e t h e w o r d s " f a c t o r e d " or " f a c t o r i n g " a r e used in t h e 
p r o s p e c t u s , the word i s surrounded by quo ta t i on marks reasonably 
d e s i g n e d to make i t c l e a r t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n of t h a t term i s 
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unique, that reference should be made to the definition of the 
word as it is set forth in the prospectus beginning at page 11, 
and that readers shouldn't rely on their general understanding of 
the term. The definition in the prospectus clearly includes 
elements different from traditional factoring of current accounts 
l^ iriiAvabJLe because it announces the company's intention to also 
purchase third-party notes at a discount (Exhibit 3, page 11). On 
page 12 of the prospectus is a section entitled "B. OTHER RELATED 
BUSINESSES:" which clearly advises investors that the company 
intends to engage in the general business of lending money on a 
secured basis; and that the security to be procured may well not 
include short-term intangible assets. The last paragraph of page 
12 also clearly advises investors of the company's intention to 
"...be involved in financing real estate acquisitions for its 
customers, either through mortgage financing or by purchasing 
property for lease to its customers." There is no breakdown in 
which the company commits to any particular allocation of the 
proceeds from the sale of notes. 
Beginning at the bottom of page 13 is a description of 
the notes, which contains information to the effect that for six 
month promissory notes American Factoring would pay an interest 
rate of 24% per annum; that for one year notes the interest rate 
would be 30% per annum; and that for two year notes, the company 
would pay 36% per annum. Further descriptions of the notes, 
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include comments related to restrictions on the marketability of 
the notes, the nature of the subscription agreement, and the terms 
of the offering are found in succeeding pages. The prospectus is 
accompanied by a audited financial statement dated March 31, 1982 
over the signature of Hansen, Barnett and Maxwell, certified 
public accountants, attesting to the result of the company's 
operations for the period ending March 31, 1982. These financial 
statements reflect prior sales of promissory notes by the company. 
What is most significant is that this prospectus does 
not contain a single word stating or implying that any of the 
promissory notes to be sold to investors were to be secured by any 
collateral of any type or sort whatever; and, though it says that 
the loans made using investor funds were to be secured, there is 
no representation in the prospectus related to the ratio of that 
security to the sum total of notes owed to American by its clients 
or the notes owed by American Factoring to the investors. 
This is important because in his trial testimony, Glen 
Bingham conceded that the only representations he made to 
investors that were not contained in the prospectus were 
statements to the effect that the transactions entered into by 
American Factoring would be collateralized by trust deeds to real 
property and that when he had examined the deeds and appraisals 
related to existing transactions, he noted that the collateral 
values were at least two to one and sometimes as much as four to 
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one above the sums loans to the debtors. Bingham conceded that 
though Moore had not authorized him to do so, he told some 
investors that "when people asked me about it, I would say it was 
at least two to one and as much as four to one." (Tr. 1-29). See 
also Tr. Vol. I page 30 for a recitation of Moore's warning to 
Bingham that he say nothing not contained in the prospectus. The 
fact that Bingham made recitations related to collateral values 
was corroborated by virtually all of the note purchasers during 
their trial testimony. Their statements are summarized in the 
State's Affidavit for Probable Cause found at R. 14-30. 
Illustrative of the misstatements which the State 
claimed violated the provisions of Section 61-1-1(2), U.C.A. are 
those set forth in paragraphs 9a through 9e of the probable cause 
Affidavit (R. 17). These, and like representations allegedly made 
to other investors can be synthesized as follows; and when one 
analyzes the evidence related to each of them, it becomes clear 
that defendant is simply not guilty of the offenses of which he 
was convicted. 
Alleged Misrepresentation No. 1. 
American Factoring was engaged in the business 
of "factoring", that is purchasing current 
accounts receivable at discounts of from 5 to 
15% which it would collect in from 30 to 60 
days. 
Brian McGavin, C.P.A. testified that during the period 
in which the alleged victims purchased notes, American Factoring 
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was, in f a c t , engaged in f ac to r ing c u r r e n t accounts r e c e i v a b l e for 
a number of s m a l l b u s i n e s s e s (Tr. 1 1 1 - 6 9 - 7 1 ) . His t e s t i m o n y was 
co r robo ra t ed by documentary evidence found at stamped page 132055, 
e t s e q . of E x h i b i t 74 and the t e s t i m o n y of Lee F e i t (Tr. I I I - l l l -
120) and o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g Mark Wood who l i t e r a l l y so ld s e v e r a l 
hundred thousand d o l l a r s worth of no tes to American (See Exh ib i t 
32). The note s a l e s of which a p p e l l a n t s t ands convic ted occurred 
r e l a t i v e l y e a r l y in the h i s t o r y of the company when t h a t aspec t of 
t h e company 's b u s i n e s s was more p r o m i n e n t than i t was a f t e r 
L a n s e a i r and t h e Dents became v i r t u a l l y the on ly c l i e n t s of 
American. Beyond t h a t , none of the i n v e s t o r ' s money was used for 
p u r p o s e s not d e s c r i b e d in t he p r o s p e c t u s . The e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y 
e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t both t he s t a t e m e n t s made in the p r o s p e c t u s and 
those made by Bingham were t rue when they were made to the a l l eged 
v i c t i m s . 
Alleged Misrepresentation No. 2. 
That the Company's receivables would be 
secured by collateral worth four times the sum 
or the debt or the value of the receivables 
purchased. 
First, by reference to stamped page 032065 through 
032067 of Exhibit 74, Brian McGavin established that according to 
applicable appraisals, the real property pledged by Lanseair was 
worth 2.37 times the sum of its debt; and that hypothecated by 
Dent & Associates was worth 3.69 times the sum of its obligation 
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(Tr. 111-96-98). See also Exhibit 29, the collateral schedule 
prepared by George Miller. The cumulative ratio is 3.04 to 1; 
but that ratio is based upon the total sum of principle and 
interest owed by these companies, not merely the sum of principal 
provided by American. The statements regarding collateral values 
made by Mr. Bingham were literally true when they were made. 
Second, beyond approving a general statement in the 
prospectus that American's receivables would be covered by 
"adequate security", Michael Moore did not utter, or authorize 
anyone else to make any statements whatsoever concerning the ratio 
of collateral to debt that would be maintained by American 
Factoring. On the contrary, he clearly instructed Bingham (and 
the other salesmen) not to say anything to the investors beyond 
what was stated in the prospectus (Tr. 1-29-30). Due process 
could not tolerate a conviction based upon misrepresentations 
which were made without Moore's knowledge and contrary to his 
direct instructions. 
Alleged Misrepresentation No. 3. 
That the collateral was real estate conveyed 
to American Factoring by deed so that American 
could avoid foreclosure proceedings in the 
event of default. 
Exhibits 28, 30 and 33 are exhibits containing grant 
deeds or warranty deeds which are exactly the kind of documents 
Bingham described to investors. Exhibit 34 is one of the trust 
deeds given to American Factoring to secure Dent & Associates 
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i n d e b t e d n e s s ; and S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s Gar th H e i n e r , an employee of 
Assoc ia ted T i t l e Company, t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he re were s i m i l a r t r u s t 
d e e d s i s s u e d in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e b a l a n c e of t h e Dent 
t r a n s a c t i o n (Tr. 1 1 - 9 6 ) . Though he he ld the deeds s u b j e c t t o 
e sc row i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t they were not to be r e c o r d e d , he was 
forced to concede t h a t as between Dent & Assoc ia t e s and American, 
t h o s e d e e d s r e p r e s e n t e d a conveyance of a l l D e n t ' s t i t l e to the 
p roper ty to American Fac to r ing (Tr, I I I - 1 9 9 ) . 
Alleged M i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n No. 4. 
That as a r e s u l t of t he f o r e g o i n g c o l l a t e r a l 
s e c u r i t y p r e c a u t i o n s t a k e n by Amer i can , t h e 
i n v e s t m e n t was " r i s k - f r e e " or " s a f e r than a 
bank". 
F i r s t , a p p e l l a n t r e i t e r a t e s the proven f a c t t h a t he 
d i r e c t l y i n s t r u c t e d Glen Bingham not t o make any s t a t e m e n t s not 
conta ined in the p r o s p e c t u s , and t h a t a t t o r n e y Neil Sabin issued a 
s i m i l a r warn ing to s a l e s m e n (Tr. 34, 35) . I t would appear t h a t 
Bingham independent ly reviewed documents which convinced him t h a t 
the c o l l a t e r a l held by American was s u f f i c i e n t to remove the r i s k 
from the i n v e s t m e n t ; bu t he made such s t a t e m e n t s to i n v e s t o r s 
wi thout the knowledge or consent of a p p e l l a n t (Tr. 1-45, 46). 
Second, the p rospec tus i s r e p l e t e with language advis ing 
i n v e s t o r s t h a t t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t in American F a c t o r i n g n o t e s was 
s p e c u l a t i v e . Spec i f i c f a c t o r s render ing the investment r i sky are 
s e t f o r t h in s i g n i f i c a n t d e t a i l ; and to p r e v e n t the very s o r t of 
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thing that happened with Glen Bingham's representations, investors 
were instructed that they could not rely on any statement about 
the company that was not contained in the prospectus. What more 
could a company do to insure that no investor made his decision on 
the basis of extraneous factors? 
In summary, the evidence clearly establishes that the 
four categories of alleged misstatements for which appellant was 
convicted were either not misstatements at all, or were conveyed 
to investors by Glen Bingham without appellant's knowledge or 
consent. 
It is significant that page 7 of Exhibit 48, an 
accounting summary of the affairs of American Factoring produced 
by the State of Utah, demonstrates that a total of $5,063,752.00 
in investor funds were deposited in Utah banks by American 
Factoring Corporation. Glen Bingham testified that he was 
responsible for sale of approximately $1,000,000 of these notes. 
Obviously, the balance were sold by other salesmen (Tr. 1-23). 
Not a single count of this Indictment involved an investor who 
brought his promissory notes from anybody but Glen Bingham; and 
the State of Utah has brought no other prosecution charging any 
offense in connection with the sale of American Factoring notes by 
any other person. This raises the obvious inference that but for 
misrepresentations made by Glen Bingham alone, the sale of these 
notes could have been accomplished consistent with the law. The 
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t r i a l e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t i n s o f a r as Bingham's s t a t e m e n t s 
were proven f a l s e , Michael Moore did not know about them and did 
not d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y a u t h o r i z e t h a t they be made. For t h a t 
r e a s o n , he i s not g u i l t y of any o f f e n s e a g a i n s t t he laws of t h e 
S t a t e of Utah. 
F i n a l l y , a t t e n t i o n needs to be d i r e c t e d to the language 
of S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 1 ; for t h a t s e c t i o n does not f o r b i d the use of 
j u s t any mis s t a t emen t in connect ion with the s a l e of a s e c u r i t y . 
In order to c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of the Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s 
Ac t , the m i s s t a t e m e n t made by s e l l e r s of s e c u r i t i e s must be 
" m a t e r i a l " . The term " m a t e r i a l " as used in s e c u r i t i e s r e g u l a t i o n s 
has g e n e r a l l y been d e f i n e d to i n c l u d e on ly t h o s e f a c t s " . . . t h a t 
a r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t o r migh t have c o n s i d e r e d . . . i m p o r t a n t in the 
making of h i s d e c i s i o n . " See , e . g . , A^fJ^L^ated Ute C^i^jzens o j 
2i5i} XJL Uj]ij:^<3 S t a t e s , 406 U.S. 128, 31 Lawyer ' s E d i t i o n 2nd 7 4 1 , 
92 Supreme Cour t 1456 (1972) . In t he i n s t a n t c a s e , CPA Br ian 
McGavin t e s t i f i e d t h a t the m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a l l eged to have been 
made by Glen Bingham did not m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r or e f f e c t the 
f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of American Fac tor ing (Tr. 111-96-98). Whether 
i t was making the money n e c e s s a r y to pay the h igh r a t e s of 
i n t e r e s t p romised to i n v e s t o r s from the l i t e r a l f a c t o r i n g of 
s h o r t - t e r m b u s i n e s s r e c e i v a b l e s , or e n t e r i n g i n t o h igh i n t e r e s t 
loans secured by r e a l e s t a t e was i r r e l e v a n t . When the s t a t e m e n t s 
in the p rospec tus were made, the r e a l e s t a t e market was good, the 
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debtors were pledging collateral security which was appraised at 
values substantially in excess of the sum of the indebtedness, and 
the investments of the note holders appeared to be secure (See 
financial statements of American Factoring as at June 29, 1982 
found in States1 Exhibit 3), appraisal Exhibits 70, 72 and 73, and 
auditing documents contained in Exhibit 74). Though the business 
failed, it did so only because Dent & Associates and Lanseair, 
through Lynn Bogart, failed to pay the debt they had undertaken to 
pay. The business of American Factoring was fairly presented to 
the investors in the prospectus; they were advised that it was 
speculative; and each elected to purchase the notes based upon his 
evaluation of that fair presentation. Under such circumstances, 
verdicts finding the defendant guilty of having willfully made 
misrepresentations or omissions of fact cannot be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons defendant Michael Moore prays 
the Court to reverse the verdicts and judgments of conviction 
herein and either remand the case to the Seventh Judicial District 
Court of Duschene County, Utah, for retrial, or dismiss the 
Indictment on the basis that it is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
DATED this J^ ?j2* day of October, 1989. 
'\&aJL*-
BARBER 
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I certify I delivered ^true and correct coptfsof the 
foregoing to Robert N. Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this J£?Q- day 
of October, 1989. 
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